What are three reasons why over centralization can cause serious problems for an organization?

Organizational Structure

Lois E. Tetrick, Michael K. Camburn, in Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology, 2004

2.1.2 Organizational Consequences of Centralization

Centralization allows an organization, or at least the upper levels of the organization, to control lower level employees’ behaviors so that they are consistent with organizational goals. Also, high degrees of centralization reduce the need for high levels of formal procedures because managers already directly monitor and advocate appropriate behaviors without needing written standards. However, as the organization increases its members and functions, the core group of top managers is less able to monitor all of the activities within the organization and more authority is shifted to departmental managers. Furthermore, centralization may constrain adoption of innovative ideas because lower levels in the organization have little decision-making power.

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0126574103005250

Housing and Sustainable Transport

E. Holden, K. Linnerud, in International Encyclopedia of Housing and Home, 2012

Decentralised Concentration

Centralisation, then, results in low energy consumption for everyday travel and decentralisation seems to result in lower energy consumption for leisure-time travel. How can we achieve the best from both camps? The answer is decentralised concentration, which combines the energy efficiency gained from the compact urban form with the broader quality-of-life aspects gained from the dispersed city (there are other ‘middle positions’ such as the urban village, new urbanism, the sustainable urban matrix, transit-oriented development, and smart growth).

To achieve decentralised concentration it could be useful to take a closer look at the concepts of ‘centralisation’ and ‘densification’. These two concepts are often regarded as being two sides of the same coin, but this does not have to be the case at all. On the contrary, it is two other conceptual pairs which are often confused: ‘centralisation–decentralisation’ and ‘concentration–dispersal’. By combining these two pairs, we get four models of urban form (Figure 1).

What are three reasons why over centralization can cause serious problems for an organization?

Figure 1. Four models of sustainable urban form.

Reproduced from Holden E (2004) Ecological Footprints and Sustainable Urban Form. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 19(1): 91–109.

Susan Owens, the respected English planning theorist from Cambridge University, asserts that in theory ‘decentralised concentration’ often emerges as relatively efficient in terms of travel and energy requirements. This is not simply a theory; empirical studies also confirm this view. It is a view which is supported by a large number of prominent transport and planning researchers around the world (Breheny, 1992; Holden, 2007; Jenks et al., 1996; Williams and Jenks, 2000).

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080471631005919

Unitary State

R.A.W. Rhodes, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

4 For and Against Centralization

Centralization is the root of all evil for advocates of decentralization. The arguments for and against are clear even if there is no foreseeable end to the debate. So centralization promotes territorial justice and equality. Central authorities uphold service standards, rationalize resource allocation, and coordinate local development. There is a need for national plans, especially when resources are scarce, and only the center can ensure territorial equality by the central provision of funds and supervising the uniform implementation of national policies. Centralization is encouraged by financial weakness, national elites, including the bureaucracy, eager to protect their interests, and political instability.

On the other hand, decentralization is often said to be the counterweight to central power. Liberal-democratic theory assumes that decentralization promotes democratic participation, especially local self-government. Nationally, decentralization is said to promote political education, training in political leadership, and political stability. In local government, it promotes the values of equality, accountability, and responsiveness (Smith 1985, p. 20, Sharpe 1970). It is also said to have many managerial or administrative advantages. First, it is seen as a way or surmounting the administrative incompetence of the center; that is, the limits of national planning, by getting closer to problems, cutting through red tape, and meeting local needs. Second, it improved central ‘penetration’ of rural areas, spreading knowledge of, and mobilizing support for, the plan and bypassing obstructive local elites. Third, it encouraged the involvement of various religious, ethnic, and tribal groups, promoting national unity. Fourth, it increased the speed and flexibility of decision-making, encouraging experimentation, and reducing central control and direction. Fifth, it increased the efficiency of the center by freeing top management from routine tasks and reducing the diseconomies of scale caused by congestion at the center. Sixth, it increased the administrative capacity of the localities and regions, and improved the coordination of service delivery. Finally, it institutionalized participation, provided opportunities for many interests to get a ‘stake’ in the system, trained citizens for democracy and politicians for government, and promoted political maturity and democratic stability (paraphrased from Rondinelli and Cheema 1983, pp. 14–16 and Smith 1985, pp. 186–8). Unfortunately, decentralization has not lived up to its promises. The strongest argument for centralization is the failure of decentralization, especially in developing countries, where the main outcome is chaotic inefficiency.

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767011220

What is benefit assessment?

Viveca Nyström, Linnéa Sjögren, in An Evaluation of the Benefits and Value of Libraries, 2012

Asking relevant questions

Centralisation is needed in order to achieve standardised measurements. However, in order to win support and motivation, questions need to be formulated that are related as closely as possible to each specific library. Unless the question is relevant, the measurements will not be of interest. In other words, we need to focus on the questions, and these may originate from within the organisation or from outside it. Measuring is a form of feedback and response. Formulating the problem is the most important prerequisite for measuring.

National statistics and local measurements can be completely different phenomena because of the specific environment in which each library operates. The most relevant questions may vary even between two branches in the same city. But rather than trying to choose either one or the other, it is more reasonable to take both into consideration. This book is intended to provide inspiration for those who are attempting to measure and evaluate at the local level.

Hopefully, major libraries and Statistics Sweden (or corresponding national institutions) will take forward work that addresses issues related to national statistics.

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781843346869500017

Prosecution

K. Levine, M. Feeley, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

2 Centralized or Decentralized Office

Centralization or decentralization of oversight affects all aspects of the prosecutorial function, from the hiring and training of staff, to the implementation of policies for filing and processing cases, to levels of responsiveness to public opinion. Scholars can distinguish between those highly centralized systems that place prosecutors in an national civil service hierarchy led by the Ministry of Justice, and those decentralized systems that consider prosecutors to be locally selected (and often elected) political officials. Overall these structural and institutional features are likely to be closely related to the larger structure of government and to make a difference (Damaska 1981). Needless to say, variations exist between these extremes, and even within each category, according to hiring practices or filing control.

At one extreme is the American experience. The vast majority of criminal cases—both serious and minor—in the United States are filed and processed at the state level. However, ‘State Control’ is something of a misnomer, because most American state prosecutors are county officials who enforce state law. The chief prosecutor of each office (usually called the district attorney) is elected by the people, while the deputies or assistants may be either career civil servants or employees of a specific administration. State attorneys general have little control over their behavior or filing practices, handling mostly training and appeals (Flemming et al. 1992). Each county operates its own hiring system and typically recruits graduates from local law schools. There is little advance training for the job; on-the-job training occurs locally, within the office or in short courses run by the state. As a result, each office sets its priorities according to the demands of its electorate and according to the interests of its leaders; this can produce great diversity in policies among prosecutors' offices, even within the same state (Utz 1979, Feeley 1979).

At the other end of the spectrum lie countries like France and Japan, where the procuracy is tightly controlled and pyramidal in shape. For example, at the apex of the Japanese system sits the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, followed by eight High Public Prosecutors Offices and then fifty District Public Prosecutors Offices. At the base are 452 Local Public Prosecutors Offices, located in major cities throughout Japan. The Local Offices prosecute only relatively minor cases, while the District Offices handle all serious crimes. Moreover, Japanese prosecutors are an elite subset of the population; they have graduated from top law schools, passed an extremely rigorous bar exam, and endured two years of training at the Supreme Court's Legal Training Institute. Because they are overseen by the Supreme Court, Japanese prosecutors at all levels have close association with judges; indeed, prosecutors can transfer to judicial work if they like and vice versa. As a result of their training and the hierarchy within which they work, and perhaps their close association with the judiciary, Japanese prosecutors value consistency in case-handling to a degree which other nations' prosecutors find almost inconceivable (Johnson 1996, 1998).

Centralization also affects the extent to which prosecutors can be influenced by public opinion. Officials in decentralized offices are often vulnerable to intense local political pressures and media criticism. In contrast, where public prosecutors' offices form part of a civil service hierarchy headed by the Ministry of Justice, prosecutors may consider themselves more immune from public opinion. They contend that this immunity is crucial in order for the prosecutor to remain objective and impartial; it allows him to more easily dismiss cases for insufficient evidence, or to prosecute popular or famous citizens, without fear of retaliation on election day. These claims to immunity should not be taken at face value, however; some modern prosecutors in Italy, Spain, France, and Portugal will actively court the media to generate public interest and support for their cases. Prosecutors in civil service countries are also much less likely than American prosecutors to leave government work for private practice; hence, they are less concerned about keeping good relations with the local defense bar. However, the existence of tight governmental controls provides a different sort of pressure: at least one scholar has noted that Japanese prosecutors have been severely criticized for failing to prosecute corrupt politicians (Johnson 1996).

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767028679

Animal Health

Richard Shephard, ... Loren Shaffer, in Handbook of Biosurveillance, 2006

6.1 Veterinary Databases

There is no centralization of private veterinary EVR database information. Veterinarians contribute case details for notifiable diseases to their relevant authority (state or federal department of agriculture). However, the development of a central system that can capture and monitor the clinical picture of veterinary case load would be useful for detecting change to the pattern of disease presentation, similar to systems that monitor ED submissions in human medicine.

The National Animal Health Information System (NAHIS) operating within Australia is an example of a coordinated multispecies centralized animal disease database. The information within NAHIS allows Australia to report the national disease status for multiple pathogens and multiple host species to the OIE and to other trading partners. Many organizations, including state and federal departments of agriculture, quarantine services, the Animal Health Australia, and wildlife organizations, provide data to NAHIS. However, NAHIS only collects aggregated data from the various reporting bodies, and data are not provided in real time. The U.S. equivalent is the aforementioned nascent NAHRS. The USDA collects data into NAHRS from similar sources and in a similar form to the data provided to NAHIS in Australia.

The majority of university-affiliated veterinary healthcare facilities send data to the Veterinary Medicine DataBase (VMDB), a project housed at the University of Illinois. The National Cancer Institute originally established VMDB to help researchers study cancer in animals. Today, veterinary hospitals send diagnoses and procedure codes to VMDB. Submission does not occur in real time; lag times vary from a few days to months, with one participant offering an average of 2 to 3 weeks. Although VMDB is a rich storehouse of data on millions of animal health care encounters, its usefulness in the early detection of epidemics is very limited (Veterinary Medical Database, 2004; Kansas State University–Manhattan, KS, Medical Records Department, personal communication, 2005; University of Missouri–Columbia, MO, Medical Records Department, personal communication, 2005).

To encourage timely submissions and enhance the surveillance value of the database, VMDB has offered the veterinary community a free electronic submission utility that harnesses SNOMED. Submission, although still entirely voluntary, is easier now, and VMDB's staff hopes the new software will lead to significantly reduced lag times.

The Rapid Syndrome Validation Project for Animals (RSVP-A) is currently being examined to see if it offers an effective means of monitoring the health of cattle. The system required clinical veterinarians to classify cases into one of six major syndrome groupings. The data recording and transmission occurs in real time by the use of mobile computing devices. The Kansas State University study is determining the usability and utility of the system, with a primary focus on completeness of veterinary reporting and acceptance by veterinarians of the technology (De Groot et al., 2003).

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123693785500090

The road to nowhere

James Scambary, in The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific, 2017

18.5 The centralization of power

Gusmão’s centralization of power within the prime minister’s office and later, to his new ‘super ministry,’ has had a major impact on the nature and quality of major national level expenditure. Despite stepping down from power early in 2015, Gusmão’s new position as self-appointed head of his own self-designed Ministry of Planning and Strategic Investment means that he continues to maintain total control over the capital budget and the three main regulatory bodies overseeing infrastructure spending. An internal UN presentation, leaked in 2011, drew a virulent backlash from the government when it claimed that Gusmão’s growing recourse to executive-style authority was undermining both accountability and the rule of law (Tempo Semanal, 2011). This is not an isolated perspective; according to a confidential 2008 US Embassy cable, Gusmão has taken many decisions himself without consultation with his ministers, or, at best, only with a small coterie of advisers or confidantes. This small circle, the cable states, were typically figures from the clandestine resistance well known to the prime minister and who serve as brokers for foreign firms (US Embassy, 2008).

Some of the biggest budget expenditures and contracts have been allocated in this way. The most notorious case was the contract for the national electricity grid. In 2008, a contract for the construction of a nationwide electrical power grid and power plant was awarded to a Chinese construction company CNI22. The project was worth more than 40 percent of the national budget, yet the tender period lasted less than three weeks, with only about two pages of specifications (La’o Hamutuk, 2011a). This generated widespread suspicion that the purchase had been agreed before the government announced the tender. Again, according to the leaked cable, Gusmão made the decision and someone from his inside circle brokered the deal, with no consultation with the Electricity Department (US Embassy, 2008). With growing evidence of incompetence and mismanagement, and after sustained pressure from IFIs, the government reallocated the contract to an Indonesian firm, nearly doubling the cost of the entire project in the process (La’o Hamutuk, 2011a). While the tender process that awarded the contract in the first place was derisory, as a Deloitte report on the Electricity Department noted, despite being approved by the Council of Ministers, there was no documentation to indicate a tender process had been followed at all for the reassignment of the contract (Deloitte, 2011a).

The lack of an adequate tender process and failure to consult relevant ministries and expert advice on the most appropriate and cost-effective designs have major and sometimes ongoing cost implications. The current total electricity generation capacity provided by the new generators under the electrification scheme, for example, is at least five times the current peak level of demand. Increased electricity generation capacity has resulted in a fivefold fuel budget increase since 2009, and it is expected to climb, given that the tender process for fuel supplies is also less than transparent (World Bank and Ministry of Finance, 2015). A report on the Millennium Development Goal social housing project—also awarded to a government donor without an adequate tender process—found that prices of construction materials were inflated by as much as 1441% (Audit Chamber, 2015d). The quality of single-source road construction and other projects has also been widely condemned, with some roads, for example, left unfinished or deteriorating only months or weeks after being built, requiring constant and recurrent expenditure. The World Bank/MoF report described a “build, neglect, rebuild” culture within the Secretariat of State for Public Works (2015).

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780081011096000186

Cities and Geography

Helmuth Cremer, Pierre Pestieau, in Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 2004

4.3.3 Centralization versus cooperation

We now come to the question of whether a central government is capable of redistribution. In that regard, it is again important to underline the differences between a federal setting, such as that of the United States, and a confederal one, such as the European Union. In a confederation the costs of mobility (particularly labor mobility) are higher that in a federation. More importantly, in the European Union case, there is no real central government. In other words, one cannot discuss the issue of centralization versus decentralization in the same way as in a federal state. Reforms towards efficiency or equity have to be approached from the viewpoint of negotiation, cooperation and above all Pareto-improving moves. Welfare improvements are not sufficient, as the prevailing decision rule is most often unanimity. Thus the usual debate over centralization versus decentralization is changed into a debate over Pareto-improvement with and without compensations.

In the perfectly symmetric case, the first-best allocation can easily be achieved by cooperative agreement. Alternatively, if the central government imposes some minimum standards of taxation that yield the optimal solution, these ought to be unanimously agreed upon. Most often, however, there is no perfect symmetry. Then, it is likely that moving towards the first-best optimal solution involves different gains across countries or even losses in some. In this case, compensatory schemes or logrolling procedures have to be considered. Note however that even in asymmetric cases, some minimum standards can be Pareto-improving.

Wildasin (1991) examines an economic union within what he calls a common labor market such as assumed here. He allows for corrective subsidies by a central government and reaches the striking result that with optimal subsidies the tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across regions. This implies that regions with weaker preferences for redistribution should receive larger subsidies. There is however a problem with Wildasin's argument. Even if one restricts the corrections of Nash equilibria to Pareto corrections, they imply side payments. In other words, the optimal scheme is such that in a two region setting the less redistributive one is compensated so as to allow for productive efficiency and impose the same tax as the more redistributive region. Even though such a scheme ought to be unanimously supported, its actual implementation might be difficult. In a subsequent paper, Wildasin (1994a) considers a setting with mobile recipients of income transfers and shows that a region subject to labor immigration may gain by paying some transfers to workers in the source region so as to reduce the level of immigration.

Also related to the debate of centralization versus cooperation is the availability of information for different levels of governments. It is argued that lower levels authorities (being “closer” to these tax base) have better information to implement the tax system, and this is a point in favor of decentralization. But once again this advantage seems to be different in federal and confederal systems.24

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574008004800142

Automated, Decentralized Trust: A Path to Financial Inclusion

Andreas Freund, in Handbook of Blockchain, Digital Finance, and Inclusion, Volume 1, 2018

20.1 Setting the Stage

Financial exclusion is a byproduct of centralization as expressed through centralized entities such as governments or banks in all societies. Centralization was and still is the most important concept in our societal development. Why is that? The answer is quite simple, evolution made us quasi linear beings because for millions of years nothing changed for us. Normally nothing happening outside a couple of days walk or ride impacted us. Change was slow and steady, if it occurred at all. Families and small tribes dominated through the formative millennia of Homo-Sapiens. Homeostasis was the norm, not the exception. The best visual of this is the picture of the evolution of the world population and the world social development index and its components over time in Fig. 20.1.

What are three reasons why over centralization can cause serious problems for an organization?

Figure 20.1. World population and social development index.

As one can easily see, nothing really changed much during the millennia of human existence until the development of the steam engine as the largest driver of global change in our history. This started the exponential evolution of mankind. As one can see, we are evolving exponentially but since evolution made us quasi linear, humans are singularly inept to recognize exponential changes until it is too late. Exponential behavior cannot be readily detected by the software and hardware of our bodies that nature gave us. We desperately need a software and hardware upgrade. And this is what the promise of exponential technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, the Internet of Things, Blockchain, 3D printing, Drones, Synthetic Biology and Nanotechnologies hold for the human race; to help us recognize and effectively harness exponential behavior and changes.

In addition to being linear beings, humans did not come together into larger groups until the invention of agriculture which prompted the formation of villages, a centralization concept similar to the family, but at a larger scale. Villages then grew into towns and cities as trade between villages picked up. However, because most of our evolutionary time was spent in very small units, evolution in its attempt to optimize our bodies for our environment gave us what behavioral scientists now call the Dunbar limit (Dunbar, 1992). The Dunbar limit is the number of stable and trusted social relationships an individual can maintain, and is typically assessed to be between 100 and 250, depending on study. This means that any level of trust beyond, say 150 people, the number originally proposed by Dunbar, is impossible for an individual without additional trust arbiters. Therefore, when many humans come together, they need a trust authority, a 3rd party that they themselves trust such as a government or a bank to ensure order. Therefore, order is nothing but trust that individuals will behave in a certain way. For example, we rely on the fact that laws are in place and enforced such that people will not kill one another, because there are sever punishments in place for such an order violation. The introduction of 3rd party trust arbiters to allow the size of human groups to go beyond the Dunbar limit was a fundamental shift in how humans organized. Furthermore, since participants of those trusted 3rd party entities were and are humans too, the Dunbar limit applies as well. And, typically, the limit of stable and trusted social relationships for an individual in a group of less well known people is significantly lower than 150. This fact gave rise to hierarchies such as kingdoms and later on large companies. It is still present in virtually all organizations large and small on this planet. This organizing principle of centralized trust agents has not changed for thousands of years, since mankind had no way to automate and decentralize trust, until today. More about that statement later on.

An immediate consequence of such a centralized trust model, as just described, is that if one has not been bestowed by an agreed upon trust entity the tag of “I trust this individual” through an agreed upon attestation process, one will be left out of all the benefits others enjoy that are “on the inside”. Of course, such a system is not binary, but has many layers of trust, and, therefore, the more trusted one is, the more benefits one enjoys – a bank account, a driver's license, a registered deed to one's house, a loan to buy a car, access to exclusive information giving an individual economic advantages and so forth. Given that the 3rd party arbiters of trust are governed by humans, they are imminently fallible and corruptible. The more one has, the more access one has, the more one can influence decisions of those 3rd party trust arbiters to one's own or a group's benefit. The inverse, therefore, is also true leading to financial exclusion.

This is why billions of people, their human potential and the assets they hold, have been systematically shut out of the financial and economic workings of the global economy. They can be exploited without repercussions because they, economically and financially speaking, do not exist within a reliable legal framework. The question that comes immediately to mind is, why are we behaving this way? The answer to this question will enable us to understand not only the motivation behind the current state of affairs but also developments that we are seeing around us right now; exponential changes in society and technology, where one is reinforcing the other. The understanding and harnessing of these developments holds the key to including the billions of people that have been shut out from advancement and economic growth.

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128104415000300

Community, Social Contexts of

T.N. Clark, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

3 Searching for Democracy and Trust In Active Civic Groups

An early critic of Napoleonic state centralization was Alexis de Tocqueville, whose Democracy in America in the 1830s contrasted the French state-dependency of citizens with the rich array of American community associations. Local civic groups, linked to small and autonomous local governments, gave (ideally) all citizens the ability to participate meaningfully in decisions affecting them. Such experiences built networks of social relations and taught the values of participation, democracy, and trust in fellow citizens. Parallel ideas have been advanced in research on organizations, small groups, families, and socialization: more participation by all generates more social interaction among peers, and more social skills and trust. This is achieved better in small units, encouraging more focused exchange and meaningful social contacts. This has similarly led to analyzing specific types of intermediary groupings, from social classes to political parties, churches, and business groups.

Large literatures document these basic ideas in studies of different types of associations, causes and consequences of greater participation, citizen trust, and confidence in leaders. Over the twentieth century, many organizations shifted from the hierarchical and centralized to the smaller and more participatory. The community power literature from Floyd Hunter (1953) to Robert Dahl (1961) and beyond suggests a decline in the ‘monolithic’ city governance pattern which Hunter described in Atlanta. In contrast, Dahl documented a more participatory, ‘pluralistic’ decision-making process, where multiple participants combine and ‘pyramid’ their ‘resources’ which affects decisions in different ‘issue areas’ Dahl's quoted concepts highlighted freedom of choice and openness of leadership to popular initiatives. Some 160 studies were completed seeking to explore implications for Hunter vs. Dahl's concepts. Peter Rossi, Robert Crain and Terry Clark started national comparative research in 1967 with the Permanent Community Sample at the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. The same US municipalities were resurveyed periodically to monitor change. These studies continue in the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project, which by 2000 included surveys of over 10,000 communities in some 30 countries.

These comparative studies document support among citizens and leaders for more decentralized, egalitarian, participation by citizens the world over. The New Political Culture (Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998) uses the FAUI data to chart the rise of new rules of the game for public decisions and building more active citizen-leader contacts via mechanisms like focused groups, block clubs, cable-TV coverage of local associations, and Internet groups. Putnam's (1993) related work documents clear differences across Italian communities, from hierarchical, state control in the South to Tocquevillian participation in the North. Fukukyama shows national differences in citizen trust to follow the pattern Tocqueville proposed: least in counties with national states that destroyed civic groups (France, Italy, former Soviet areas), more in countries with active civic groups (USA, Scandinavia).

Globalization forces have opened more hierarchically-organized societies to permit civic and political associations to emerge even if they oppose the national government. Ethnic separatist groups in Mexico, Yugoslavia, and former Soviet areas grew more active via intervention from international human rights associations, global media coverage of scandals, and international organizations like the UN and NATO. The global trend is toward the more decentralized, participatory patterns of culture, which rekindle local democracy and civic life.

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767018404

What are the problems of centralization?

Centralized control of a business can have several downsides, including stifled creativity, limited communication, inflexible decision-making, and the danger of losing a key decision-maker.

What are the disadvantages of a Centralised structure?

Disadvantages. Centralised organisational structures are often less responsive to localised external pressures. It can also lead to demotivated staff who are not being given the opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process.

What factors affect centralization of work in organizations?

Factors Affecting the Centralization.
Nature of organization. The nature of business organization influences the centralization concept to a great extent. ... .
Organization size. ... .
Nature of work. ... .
Efficiency of employees. ... .
Ability of delegation. ... .
Standardize procedures and systems. ... .
Cost efficient. ... .
Better command..

What are the pros and cons of centralization?

10 Pros and Cons of Centralization.
It employs standardization of work. ... .
It ensures unbiased work allocation. ... .
It promotes flexibility. ... .
It does not allow replication of work. ... .
It offers an area of specialization. ... .
It encourages dictatorship. ... .
It brings out the negatives in an administrative system. ... .
It is seen as inflexible..