Which of the following is/are factor(s) in explaining the formation of interest groups?

Abstract

The role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics. However, few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries. Using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries, we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics. In cross-sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables. Our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation. We discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 20742, College Park, MD

   Brendan Kennelly & Peter Murrell

Authors

1. Brendan Kennelly

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2. Peter Murrell

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Additional information

For helpful comments, we would like to thank Antonio Estache, Bruce Gardner, Dennis Mueller, Mancur Olson, and participants at the meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Southern Economic Association. The International Institute of Management of Berlin, Paul Geroski, Neal Kennedy, Alexis Jacquemin, Kenneth Platto, Joachim Schwalbach, and Hideki Yamawaki helped in providing data. The Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland is acknowledged for provision of computational resources.

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Kennelly, B., Murrell, P. Industry characteristics and interest group formation: An empirical study. Public Choice 70, 21–40 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239342

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• Received: 06 October 1989

• Accepted: 13 February 1990

• Issue Date: April 1991

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239342

Keywords

• Empirical Study
• Economic Policy
• Concentration Ratio
• Public Finance
• Interest Group

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